In my last post, I explained that I was mainly discussing the “lower end” of the commercial sex market. There are many reasons I focus on people who trade sex at the “lower end” of the market: they have least options when it comes to viable economic alternatives; they are most vulnerable to violence, exploitation, and arrest; “end demand” policies tend to employ strategies that impact them (and their clients) the most; and they are more numerous than sex workers at the opposite end (i.e. high-class courtesans and call-girls).

In limiting my discussion to this sub-population of people in the sex trade, I am making an assumption, which I think matches casual observation, that there are at least three distinct class- and economically-based segments to the sex trade. They are distinct in the sense people who trade sex rarely switch back and forth between different segments (though they may occasionally move between them), and tend to compete for different groups of clients (johns), who do not usually cross over either.

The “lower end” segment is characterized by low (or no, or even negative) downward elasticity of supply, as I explained in my previous post. This category is not necessarily restricted to those who appear worst off under objective measurements: they are not necessarily homeless, drug-addicted, mentally troubled, unable to find other work, etc. It simply means that they do not have economic alternatives they consider viable, which may be different for each person depending on her or his circumstances and priorities.

The supply and demand chart for this group would show steep, vertical, or even reversed supply curve, as discussed in my previous post.

The second segment is the market in which supply elasticity is relatively high. People who trade sex in this segment of the commercial sex market often have other sources of income (e.g. students who are financially supported by their parents) or have other economic opportunities, but engage in the sex trade for extra income, spare time, or other perks. Because they have other viable economic options and also because they have more to lose when things go wrong, they exit the market when the price for commercial sex drops below what they expect to be compensated for in exchange of risks (legal, physical, health, social/reputational) and uncomfortableness associated with the sex trade.

The supply and demand curves for this segment most closely matches what proponents of “end demand” policies might imagine, but their policy proposals won’t be effective even for this particular segment. It is because “end demand” policies focus on the prosecution, which tend to target the lower end of the market rather than the middle market where artificial reduction in demand might actually make a difference (people in this market segment prioritize safety and discreteness more than those in the lower end because they have more to lose, and are therefore harder for the law enforcement to identify). Further, even if they could successfully reduce supply within this segment, they are only reducing optional, freely entered, consensual commercial sexual transactions, and not sex trafficking or sexual exploitation of vulnerable populations.

Finally, there is a much smaller luxury market of commercial sex, which is made up of high-class call-girls (and boys) and their elite/wealthy clientele. This market is characterized by the exclusivity on both supply and demand sides, which make them unresponsive to minor fluctuations in the market forces–that is, elasticity is low for both supply and demand. It is difficult to chart this segment because clients might have (and are able to insist on) more specific preferences for a particular sex worker or sex workers, making each “product” (i.e. commercial sexual service) unique. But for the sake of comparison, the supply-demand chart might look like this:

I did not even attempt to draw “high demand” and “low demand” scenarios because “end demand” policies are unlikely to have any impact in this segment of the prostitution market. There are highly publicized cases of high-class prostitution rings being busted or famous politicians, business executives, or celebrities being caught in “sex scandals” involving high-class escorts, but they are exceptions: for the most part, sellers and buyers in this market are not affected by “end demand” campaigns such as the “National Day of Johns Arrests” which I mentioned in my previous post.

Some people believe that commercial sex might be a Veblen good. I can see that it might be a possibility at the highest end of the market, but I doubt that it explains anecdotes reported on Tits and Sass or in Superfreakonomics. If escorts can indeed get more business offering their service for $500 instead of $350, it probably has more to do with perception of signaling in a market that lacks clear information.

In my discussion, I focus on the first segment of the commercial sex market for the reasons I explained at the beginning of this post, but I thought it might help readers’ understanding to clarify what I am not discussing when I write about sex trade. I also believe that understanding downward supply-side elasticity is essential not just in distinguishing different segments of commercial sex market, but to craft effective policies to address problems associated with them–and avoid implementing counter-productive policies that are harmful to the very population they are intended to help, like many “end demand” initiatives.

“End demand” approach to addressing human trafficking continues to gain traction, as law enforcement agencies across the country hold the third “National Day of Johns Arrests.” The 10-day simultaneous campaign against alleged buyers of sex is led by Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart, who claims that 66 johns have been arrested in Cook County alone.

Of course, Sheriff Dart’s claim is dubious, considering the fact that Chicago (which is in Cook County) Police Department routinely misclassifies trans women (frequently young trans women of color) who have been arrested for selling sex as “buyers”: as of this writing, the Chicago PD lists 36 “sex buyers” on its website dedicated to publicly humiliating alleged “sex buyers,” of whom 7 are clearly dressing as women (and a couple more appear gender-ambiguous).

I have in the past pointed out why “end demand” policies are harmful to people who work in the sex trade, and even provided a further explanation for the economics of “end demand” policies. But recently I had an online exchange with someone who goes by the name “uncorrelated” and seems to know a lot more about development economics than I do that helped me explore a possibility that I have hinted before but did not feel confident enough to articulate, because it appeared to go against basic economic theories which I have not been formally trained in anyway.

But after my conversations with “uncorrelated,” I am now prepared to make an unconventional and counter-intuitive claim: that “end demand” approach to prostitution, which seeks to reduce demand for commercial sex through public education, prosecution, public humiliation, and other means, may increase prostitution, rather than decrease it, under certain (realistic) conditions.

There are two important assumptions for this claim to be true. First, I assume that prostitution market has extremely low (or negative) downward price elasticity of supply, particularly at the lower end of the market (it makes sense to focus on the lower end, because prostitution market is highly segmented and people at the lower end are the ones most vulnerable to abuse and exploitation), because of lack of viable economic alternatives. Second, I assume that people who trade sex face a trade-off between generating income through sex trade and spending time and energy doing other activities (child-raising, family, community, school, leisure, etc.).

Elasticity is the degree to which changes in one economic variable (such as price) can affect another (such as demand). It is calculated as the ratio of percentage change of the variable that is affected to that of the variable that is manipulated: for example, price elasticity of demand (i.e. degree to which demand is affected by the changes in the price) is calculated as (the change in demand):(the change in price). If a 20% increase in price for a particular product resulted in a 20% decrease in demand, the price elasticity of that product is 1; on the other hand, if the same price increase only caused a 10% decrease in demand, the elasticity is 0.5.

Proponents of “end demand” policies implicitly presume normal (high) elasticity in prostitution market: that is, they believe that a reduction in demand would be met with a comparable reduction in supply, arbitrated by the lower price for sex. Below is a supply and demand chart that presumes normal elasticity.

Dh and Dl are demand curves (although I’ve made them linear lines for the sake of simplicity) corresponding to high and low demand scenarios. Where the demand curve intersects with the supply curve (represented by the line labeled S) determines the price for which sex is traded, and the quantity of sex traded. The chart indicates that reduction of demand (shifting from Dh to Dl) lowers both price and quantity of commercial sex.

But the supply side of prostitution market (people in the sex trade) are often there in the first place because they lack other viable or comparable economic options, and the reduction of the demand (and hence the price of sex) does not change that circumstance. If many sellers of sex do not have comparable alternatives to selling sex, they will be stuck trading sex for money even if the demand (and hence the price) goes down. That is, supply in prostitution market is downwardly inelastic.

The supply and demand chart below demonstrates this inelasticity of supply. Since price elasticity of supply is defined as the ratio of change in supply to the change of price, lower elasticity can be represented by a more steep supply curve.

This chart shows the same high and low demand curves, but the supply curve has been modified to reflect a lower price elasticity of supply. Compared to the first chart, this chart shows a more drastic drop in the trading price of sex, and much smaller decrease in the quantity of sex traded. That would mean that prostitution would become far less profitable but not much less prevalent.

A more extreme version of this scenario is the one in which (virtually) none of the people currently in the sex trade have viable alternatives (which, many anti-prostitution activists argue is the case). If none of them could find other sources of income, the supply elasticity would equal zero, which would look like this:

In the “zero elasticity” scenario, the level of demand (and hence the price) is irrelevant to the level of supply, because people are dependent on having income from it. Of course if the reduction in demand is more extreme–to the point they can’t find any buyers for sexual services at a price that is more profitable than, say, panhandling–there will be no supply whatsoever. But within reason, lower demand would only result in lower income and equal quantity of prostitution in the zero elasticity scenario.

Zero elasticity scenario may seem extreme and unrealistic, but it is not, especially when we are limiting our discussion to the lower end of the prostitution market. In fact, under certain circumstances elasticity can even be negative relative to what is generally expected: that is, a decrease in demand (and hence price) can lead to an increase (rather than decrease) in supply.

As counter-intuitive as it may be, this phenomenon is not unheard of in the field of development economics. For example, when the wage (price of labor) declines in a developing nation, families may try to compensate for the lower hourly wage by working longer hours, even sending children to work alongside adults rather than to school. Similarly, economists have observed that “fair trade” initiatives designed to increase payments to farmers in the developing nations for agricultural exports have sometimes resulted in these farmers working less hours–which may be a good thing if it makes them healthier or give their children opportunities to go to school. (See the chapter two of Development Microeconomics by Pranab Bardhan and Christopher Udry.)

This occurs because households face a different set of economic incentives compared to corporations. Corporations can hire more people or fire existing employees in response to the fluctuations in the market demand, but households cannot expand or contract at will. Increasing the amount of work necessarily reduces the amount of time and energy one has for other activities such as child-raising, family, community, education, and leisure. Because of this trade-off, households (and individuals) behave differently than do corporations.

Someone who works in the sex industry also faces this trade-off: the amount they work in the sex trade is negatively correlated to the amount of time and energy they have for other activities. When the market is booming, they might be able to make ends meet with minimal amount of work, which allows them to focus their time and energy for other things; however when the market bottoms out, they might be forced to work longer hours to make ends meet, sacrificing other responsibilities (e.g. children left by themselves or with untrustworthy associates) or their health (less sleep, less leisure time).

The chart below (provided by “uncorrelated”) compares “high budget/wage” and “low budget/wage” scenarios. Uh and Ul are indifference curves that show the optimal balance between the amount of labor and the level of income (i.e. household utility) under each scenario, as determined by the household. The straight lines represent the simple correlation between the amount of work one performs and the income from that work: higher wage obviously means one can earn more for the same amount of work, hence the more steep line.

The amount of work each household decides to perform is determined at the intersection of the indifference curve and the wage line. When the price of sex decreases and the wage line shifts to the lower one, the amount of labor performed by the household goes up, from Lh to Ll, rather than going down, as predicted in a simpler economic model. If my analysis is correct, prostitution market is more like labor market in these developing nations than simpler commodity markets for things like corn and wheat.

The next chart takes into account this analysis to show what actually happens when “end demand” policies are implemented with the aim to reduce demand for commercial sex.

When the demand decreases from Dh to Dl, lowering the price from Ph to Pl, the supply actually increases, from F(Lh) (supply level in the high wage scenario) to F(Ll). This is the exact opposite from what proponents of “end demand” policies have implicitly presumed would happen, and yet it is the logical, economically-sound conclusion if you add to the mix two simple, entirely reasonable assumptions about the lack of alternatives and the trade-off faced by people in the sex trade.

One might challenge the first assumption on the basis that many people in the sex trade actually do have other viable economic opportunities and will flee the sex industry if the price starts to decline. That may be true for some segments of the prostitution market, but unlikely for many who are in the lower end of the market, whom I am focusing here. I also do not expect any “end demand” proponents to make this argument, since they tend not to believe that prostitution can be freely chosen work for vast majority of people who are in the sex trade.

Proponents of “end demand” policies are more likely to challenge the second premise, arguing that people in the sex trade are frequently (physically for psychologically) forced to engage in prostitution, and are not in the position to make rational, utility-maximizing decisions for themselves. But if pimps are making decisions, they would certainly not accept a lower income simply because the market has bottomed out: they would likely use greater coercion to extract even more labor and thus income from the person they are controlling. So the end result would be the same: less demand leads to more supply.

“End demand” policies should be rejected because they harm the very people they are intended to help, and does not even succeed at reducing the supply of commercial sex in the long term (and may in fact increase it). Any reduction of demand will be temporary, because as long as there are no other viable economic opportunities, the price will decrease until it reaches a level that can attract enough demand to return. And on top of that, “end demand” policies push away clients (johns) who are relatively safer to work with and draw in those who are most dangerous, as I’ve argued before. The solution to economic desperation and vulnerabilities is to address that economic injustice, not to (make failed attempts to) mask its symptoms.

Note: I am seeking economists or economics students who are interested in collaborating on pushing this analysis further. For example, I want to figure out a systematic way to test the hypothesis through creative use of public information such as online sex ads and arrest records (indicating major sweeps) city by city. This may be a publication opportunity. Please email me at emi AT eminism DOT org if you are interested… and please share this post with people you know who might be interested.

In response to a discussion I’ve been reading recently:

Radical feminists are correct to criticize the equation/conflation of gender roles with gender identity. But that is not a position many transgender people I know hold. That orthodoxy comes from psychologist John Money’s 1972 book, Man and Woman, Boy and Girl: The Differentiation and Dimorphism of Gender Identity from Conception to Maturity. This is the same John Money from the notorious John/Joan experiment and coverup John Colapinto wrote about in As Nature Made Him: The Boy Who was Raised as a Girl.

Money wrote, succinctly:

I know many transgender people who do not desire to fit into either of the standard sets of gender roles, and whose gender identities are not based on their desired roles in the society in relation to their gender. For many transgender people, gender identity and gender roles are not internal/external sides of the same thing, but are clearly separated.

Unfortunately, we do not have a better way to explain gender identity, which explains why this antiquated conception of gender identity remains in circulation within medical community, among some transgender people, and in the society.

But I do not believe that transgender people should have to explain their gender identity: it just is. Or as feminist philosopher Naomi Scheman once wrote, “Transsexual lives are lived, hence livable.”

Once the society and its medical “gatekeepers” stop requiring transgender people to explain their gender identity, we can eliminate the need for transgender individuals to (either uncritically or strategically) go along with the lies John Money told, simply to receive medical care, win social acceptance, and survive.

I just added many of my recent contributions on Reddit discussion forum in Interchange, the depository of my online commentaries from various fora all over the internet. Most of these comments come from /r/AskFeminists: while it is not the only “subreddit” that I frequent, it is where I tend to write more than just a brief sentence.

My comments from Reddit are very different from my other commentaries elsewhere because I am in conversation with many (mostly white, straight, cisgender) men. Feminist subreddits on Reddit are swarming with “men’s rights activists” and other, more pro-feminist men who are not very familiar with feminism.

I’m not used to this: I surround myself with queer people, feminists, radical activists and thinkers of all kinds, even online. As a result, much of what I write in various online forums end up addressing complexities of multiple oppressions. I tend to criticize feminists and queer activists more than I praise them, not because I dislike feminists or queer activists, but because I am a feminist and queer activist and I experience things within my movements that trouble me on a daily basis.

But on Reddit, I am not talking to feminists or queer activists (for the most part), and as a result I have opportunities to put forth more straightforwardly “feminist” arguments. I kind of found it refreshing to write this way, though it can easily get tiring. That said, they are not mere “feminism 101” materials: I think I bring the kind of sensibility and my own thinking that I always carry around with even though I am discussing seemingly simple topics (well simpler compared to all the super complicated social issues that I usually write about).

The five entries I’ve added to Interchange today represent these more “straightforwardly feminist” articulations of my politics, which I thought you might enjoy, especially if you are familiar with my usual writings.

• Feminism vs. Egalitarianism
• The Politics of “Women’s Sports”
• On Taking on the Label “Feminist”
• In Defense of “Bottom-Up” Feminism
• Sexism as a Social System

Enjoy!